Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 18
Issue 1 Fall 2010

Article 7

2010

Prairie Winds: A Look at Commercial Wind Farm Regulation
Within Kansas. Zimmerman v. Board of County Commissioners of
Wabaunsee County
Jonathan R. Austin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jonathan R. Austin, Prairie Winds: A Look at Commercial Wind Farm Regulation Within Kansas.
Zimmerman v. Board of County Commissioners of Wabaunsee County, 18 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 104
(2010)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol18/iss1/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law by an
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Prairie Winds: A Look at Commercial
Wind Farm Regulation Within Kansas
Zimmerman v. Boardof County Commissioners of Wabaunsee CountyI
I. INTRODUCTION

Zimmerman v. Board of County Commissioners of Wabaunsee
County presented an interesting dilemma, as green technology was put at
odds with a community's desire to protect a unique habitat located within
their county. Zimmerman, along with several other landowners, sought a
zoning permit from the Wabaunsee County Board of Commissioners ("the
Board") in order to erect Commercial Wind Energy Conversion Systems
("CWECS"). 2 The Board had not previously considered such systems, but
after several delays and hearings, the Board found CWECS contrary to the
interest of the county and community as a whole. Consequently, the
Board prohibited the systems throughout the county.
Subsequently, Zimmerman sought to declare the Board's actions
invalid. The District Court of Wabaunsee initially held that the Board
acted lawfully and reasonably. Zimmerman appealed, claiming that the
Board failed to conform to the procedures required in the zoning
statute3 and that the Board's decision to prohibit CWECS was
unreasonable. This Note explores the Kansas Supreme Court's decision,
as it considered what procedure a governing body must follow when
enacting a zoning amendment, the deference to be afforded to such
governing bodies, and what constitutes a reasonable zoning decision.
Ultimately, this Note reaffirms the Kansas Supreme Court's decision, as
the court properly held that the Board acted reasonably in its decision to
ban CWECS within the county.

'218 P.3d 400 (Kan. 2009).
2I. at 405.
3
KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 12-757 (2008).
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1I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2002, a company looking to develop commercial wind farms in
Kansas contacted the Wabaunsee County zoning administrator.4 The
zoning administrator relayed this message to the three-member Board in
October of that same year. The county had no specific zoning regulations
regarding wind farms, but upon hearing the news, the Board placed a
temporary moratorium on the acceptance of zoning applications for
conditional use permits regarding wind farms.5 In December 2002, the
Wabaunsee County Planning Commission held a public meeting to discuss
the zoning regulations regarding commercial wind farms and gauge public
opinion about the farms. No direct action resulted from this meeting, and
the Board extended the temporary moratorium.7
In August 2003, the Board, citing various changes throughout the
county, directed the planning commission to look at the 1974 Wabaunsee
County Comprehensive Plan8 (the "Plan") and recommend updates to the
Plan. After public input, the planning commission recommended that the
Board adopt this revised plan, Comprehensive Plan 2004,9 which the
Board did in April of 2004. In May 2004, the planning commission turned
its attention to zoning regulations specifically related to small and
commercial wind farms.' 0 The Board voted 2-1 against the planning

4

Zimmerman, 218 P.3d at 405.
6'Id.
Id.
'Id.
8 The original Comprehensive Plan was a report or memo commissioned by the county
which laid out the county's economic, social, and environmental plans and goals for the
fiture. Id. at 406.
9
"The Comprehensive Plan 2004 provides in relevant part that the county would endeavor
to: A. Establish an organized pattern of land use with controlled and smart growth that
brings prosperity to the county while also respecting its rural character. B. Maintain the
rural character of the county with respect to its landscape, open spaces, scenery, peace,
tranquility, and solitude.... H. Develop tourism programs involving historic properties,
nature of rural character, and scenic landscape."Id.
oId.The planning commission voted 8-2 to recommend that the Board approvethe new
zoning regulations, which would allow commercial wind farms, on a conditional basis.Id.
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commission's recommendations and banned CWECS" throughout the
county, while accepting the planning commission's recommendations for
Small Wind Energy Conversion Systems ("SWECS").12
Appellants, several different individuals who had entered into
contracts for the development of CWECS on their land within Wabaunsee
County, filed suit against the Board alleging that the Board's adoption of
the Resolution was null and void.13 Other individuals, who owned the
wind rights of properties throughout the countyl 4 , sought and were granted
the right to intervene in the lawsuit; the intervenors replicated all of the
plaintiffs' claims, with an additional inverse condemnation claim.' 5
First, Appellants contended that the Board's decision was not
wholly legislative, and the Board did not provide sufficient facts to
support the district court's finding of reasonableness.' 6 Appellants argued
that such factors as history, culture, and aesthetics do not provide the
requisite level of reasonableness needed to uphold the Board's decision.1
Second, Appellants maintained that the district court incorrectly ruled that
the Board's decision to adopt, revise, and override parts of the Planning
Commission's recommendations was lawful, because Kansas law only
allows the Board to adopt the Plan in its entirety.' 8 However, the Kansas
Supreme Court sided with the appellees and upheld each of the district
court's rulings; additionally, the court determined that the intervenors'
motions to join the suit were filed in a timely manner. 19
1"Id. at 406. The Board defined CWECS as "A Wind Energy Conversion System

exceeding 100 kilowatt or exceeding 120 feet in height above grade, or more than one
Wind Energy Conversion System of any size proposed and/or constructed by the same
person or group of persons on the same or adjoining parcels or as a unified or single
generating system." Id. at 407.
2
Id. at 406.The Board drafted Resolution No. 4-18 formally rejecting CWECS, stating
the CWECS would go against the "historical ... rural, agricultural, and scenic character of
the County ... [and] would be detrimental to property values and opportunities for
agricultural and nature based tourism." Id.
1Id.
1Id. at 405.

"Id. at 408.
16Id.
"Id. at 408-09.
"Id. at 410; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-757(d) (2008).
"Zimmerman, 218 P.3d at 405.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
As enacted by the Kansas Legislature, section 12-757 governs the
authority of a city or county to rezone land and amend the zoning
amendments within the municipality. 2 0 The governing body of a
municipality (usually the Board of County Commissioners) or the
planning commission may propose an amendment.21 "The governing
body shall establish in its zoning regulations the matters to be considered
when approving or disapproving a rezoning request." 22
Before any amendments are approved, the board must submit its
recommendations to a planning commission.2 3
It is the planning
commission's responsibility to provide notice to the public about the
proposed amendments and conduct public hearings concerning the
proposed zoning amendments. 24
After such hearings have been
conducted, the planning commissioners vote by simple majority to
recommend approval or disapproval by the governing body. 25
Recommendation of approval for the zoning amendment by the
planning commission is not an adoption of the amendment. After the
planning commission submits its recommendation, the municipality's
governing body may:
(1) adopt such recommendation by ... resolution in a

county; (2) override the planning commission's
recommendation by a 2/3 majority vote of the membership
of the governing body; or (3) return such recommendation
to the planning commission with a statement specifying the
basis for the governing body's failure to approve or
disapprove. 26

2K.

STAT. ANN.

§ 12-757.

21

Id. § 12-757(a).

22

1d.

23

24Id. § 12-757(b).

1d

25

Id. § 12-757(d).

26

1d
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If the recommendation is returned to the planning commission, the
planning commission may consider the governing body's reasons for
returning the proposal without a vote for approval or disapproval, and,
after considering such reasons, may resubmit their original
recommendation, with an explanation why they chose to resubmit the
original recommendation, or resubmit a new recommendation. 27 After
receiving this second recommendation from the planning commission, the
board "by a simple majority may adopt, revise, or amend and adopt such
recommendation by the respective ... resolution." 2 8
There are several Kansas cases that lay out the standards of review
that district and appellate courts should look to when determining the
appropriateness of a county board's zoning decision. First, in Genesis
Health Club, Inc. v. City of Wichita,2 9 the Kansas Supreme Court held that
"the power of a city government to change the zoning of property ... can

only be exercised in conformity with the statute which authorizes the
zoning." 3 0 Therefore, if a municipality fails to properly follow the
procedures laid out in the state zoning laws, the municipality's subsequent
decision is invalid. 3 1 A reviewing court will look to see if the municipality
properly followed the procedures laid out in the statutes. Although the
statute seems to clearly provide what a municipality may do when passing
zoning regulations, the court has had to interpret several provisions within
the statute.
When interpreting a statute, the appellate court is not bound by the
trial court's initial interpretation because statutory interpretation is a
question of law. 32 Additionally, the court must give "words of common
usage" within the statute their natural and ordinary usage. 33
if
ascertainable, the intent of the legislature governs, and, if the statute's

27

Id.
1d.

28

P.3d 549 (Kan. 2008).
301d. at 558 (quoting Crumbaker v. Hunt Midwest Mining Co., 69 P.3d 601, 611 (Kan.
2003)).
31
1d. (citing Crumbaker,69 P.3d at 611).
32
Schmidtlien Elec., Inc. v. Greathouse, 104 P.3d 378, 385 (Kan. 2005).
33
Id. at 387 (quoting Sawyer v. Oldham's Farm Sausage Co., 787 P.2d 697, 700 (Kan.
1990)).
29181
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language is plain and unambiguous, the court should refrain from reading
language into the statute not readily found therein. 34
The Kansas Supreme Court previously addressed the interpretation
of section 12-757(d) in Manly v. City of Shawnee.35 Manly involved a
special zoning request made by the local school board.3 6 The Kansas
Supreme Court addressed the three options available to a governing body
when deciding to adopt a zoning amendment and, more specifically,
whether the governing body could reject a planning commission's second
recommendation by a simple majority. The court found that the language
"the governing body, by a simple majority thereof, may adopt or may
revise or amend and adopt such recommendation" did allow for a
governing body to adopt, reject in whole, or reject in part the planning
commission's second recommendation. 3 7
Even if a governing body followed the proper procedures in
making its zoning determination, there is still a possibility that a court
could strike down such action if it found that the governing board acted
unreasonably. 38
Combined Investment Co. v. Board of County
Commissioners dealt with a county board's refusal to rezone a parcel of
land.
Plaintiffs argued the decision was based on one board member
acting arbitrarily. The Kansas Supreme Court held that a district court's
power in reviewing the board's decision is limited to "the lawfulness of
the action, and the reasonableness of such action." 40 The court held that
34

Steffes v. City of Lawrence, 160 P.3d 843, 849 (Kan. 2007) (citing Bd. of Leavenworth
County Comm'rs v. Whitson, 132 P.3d 920, 926 (2006)).
35194 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2008).
36
d. at 4.
37
d. at 6-8."As noted, 12-757(d) plainly gives the city the authority to 'revise or amend
and adopt' a planning commission [renewed/resubmitted] recommendation by a simple
majority vote. To circumvent that plain language, the Manlys attempt to convince us that
the City's authority to revise or amend a recommendation does not include the right to
reject or overrule the recommendation. However, that contention defies logic. Obviously,
when the City revises or amends a recommendation before taking action, it has implicitly
rejected or overruled that part of the recommended action which was not followed." Id. at
8.
38
See Combined Inv. Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 605 P.2d 533 (Kan. 1980).
"Id. at 535.
4Id. at 543-see Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130, 134 (Kan. 1978).
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the board's decision was presumptively reasonable, and that the court
should not overrule such an action unless a preponderance of the evidence
showed that the action was "so arbitrary that it can be said it was taken
without regard to the benefit or harm involved to the community at large,
including all interested parties, and was so wide of the mark that its
unreasonableness lies outside the realm of fair debate." 4 1
Although courts are reluctant to overturn a governing body's
zoning decision, courts from time to time will apply the factors laid out in
Golden v. City of Overland Park4 2 to legislative decisions that are
considered quasi-judicial.4 3 Golden also involved a city council's refusal
to rezone a landowner's piece of property. The Kansas Supreme Court
identified six different factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the board's decision:
* First, what is the character of the neighborhood and how does
the zoning regulation fit such character?;
* Second, how are the properties nearby used and zoned?;
* Third, how suitable is the property for its current zoning
restrictions?;
* Fourth, if these zoning restrictions are removed, to what extent
will the surrounding properties be detrimentally affected?;
* Fifth, how long has the subject property remained vacant
during its current zoning scheme?; and
* Finally, who will gain or lose more, the individual landowner
(as to the value of the property) or the public (as to health,
safety and welfare)? 44
The Golden court added two other factors, besides the six listed by the
trial court, to be considered. 45 First, "the recommendations of a permanent
41

CombinedInv., 605 P.2d at 544.
P.2d 130 (Kan. 1978).
43Id. at 135 ("When ... the focus shifts from the entire city to one specific tract of land for
which a zoning change is urged, the function becomes more quasi-judicial than
legislative.").
"Id.at 136 (looking at and expounding upon the factors laid out by the trial court).
42584

45, >
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or professional planning staff; and [second,] the conformance of the
requested change to the adopted or recognized master plan being utilized
by the city." 46
IV. INSTANT DECISION

Chief Justice Nuss delivered the opinion of the court. The court
noted that the parties introduced several different legal issues within their
briefs, but at oral arguments both Appellants and Intervenors conceded
that their strongest claims were that the Board's amendments of the county
zoning regulations were unlawful and unreasonable.4 7
The court first addressed whether the Board unlawfully amended
the zoning regulation recommendations regarding wind farms first
submitted by the planning commission. 4 8 According to the court, a city
government can only amend or pass zoning regulations for a property in
conformity with section 12-757(d) and failure to comply with the statute's
procedures invalidates the municipality's actions. 49 The court noted that
because it was reviewing and interpreting a statute, the issue presented
was a question of law and, consequently, it was not bound by the trial
court's interpretation. 50
The court emphasized that, in interpreting a statute, the intent of
the legislature is controlling and takes precedence over other rules. 5 ' If
the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court stated they
need only interpret the language as it appears.52 As such, an avellate
The
court "cannot read into the statute language not readily found."
court then addressed whether the Board had the power to adopt in part the
planning commission's resubmitted proposal, as the Appellants argued the
word "override" in the statute meant the Board had to completely reject or
46

d

47

Zimmerman v. Bd. of County Conm'rs, 218 P.3d 400, 409 (Kan. 2009).
48
1d
49I. at 410; see alsoKAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-757(d) (2008).
50
Zimmerman, 218 P.3d at 410.
5

lid.

58

d. (citing Steffes v. City of Lawrence, 160 P.3d 843 (Kan. 2007)).
3Id.

5
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accept the proposal.54 Previously, this court had addressed a similar issue
in Manly v. City of Shawnee;"5 in that decision, the court provided three
options for the governing body after receiving from the planning
commission a recommendation for a zoning amendment. 56 The court held
that the statute permitted a governing body to(1) approve the
recommended action by a simple majority,(2) "take action contrary to the
recommendation by a two-thirds majority vote," or (3) resubmit the
recommendation to the planning commission with its reasons for
approving or disapproving the action.5 7
Based on the court's earlier decision in Manly, which had equated
"reject," "overrule," and "override to some extent" with "revise or
amend," the court concluded that the Board did have the power to accept
or reject in part the planning commission's recommendations.
Additionally, the court addressed the legislative history of section 12757(d) and its earlier counterpart, K.S.A. 12-708.59 The court noted that
the previous statute lacked the second option to "take action contrary to
the recommendation by a two-thirds majority vote."60 Accordingly, the
court, looking to Manly, determined that the legislature gave city boards
the power to avoid pointless remands if they felt no other input or action
was needed.6 1
The instant court next addressed whether the district court erred in
determining that the Board's decision was reasonable. The court first
articulated "rules governing the scope of judicial review of zoning
matter."62 It concluded it could only overturn an administrative body's
decision when the action was clearly unreasonable on the facts presented
to the zoning authority. 63 However, before determining whether the
zoning board's decision was reasonable, the court looked to whether the
54

Id.

at 411.

194 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2008).

'6Id. at 6.

57

Zimmerman, 218 P.3d at 411 (quoting Manly, 194 P.3d at 8).
d. at 412-13(quoting Manly, 194 P.3d at 8).
sld.
MId. at 412(quotingManly, 194 P.3d at 8).
58

61d. at 413.
62

Id.

63 d.
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zoning board's decision should be considered quasi-judicial rather than
legislative.
The Appellants sought a quasi-judicial characterization of the
zoning board's actions because then eight factors from Golden v. City of
Overland Park would control. The instant court noted that the Board
acknowledged such characterization would not benefit them, but did not
necessarily invalidate their claims.6 5 The court noted there were several
benefits to Appellants if the Board's decision was characterized as quasijudicial rather than legislative, and why Appellants would seek such
characterization.66
First, "the greatest benefit of the quasi-judicial
approach to rezonings is that it requires local governments.

.

. to engage in

reasoned decision making based on articulated standards" and to "afford
enhanced procedural rights to the proponents and opponents of a
rezoning." 67 Second, the court noted that such characterization allows for
closer judicial scrutiny.68
However, if the Board's decision was
characterized as le islative, then the court would apply a highly
deferential standard. 69
The court noted, however, that even when an action is considered
quasi-judicial, Kansas courts have been reluctant to apply anything but the
highly deferential standard. 70 Even specific tract zoning, which is usually
labeled quasi-judicial, cannot really be considered such.7 Under this
reasoning the court concluded that the Board's actions were in fact
legislative.72
Additionally, even though it was not required, the court applied the
"reasonableness factors" from quasi-judicial cases (known as the Golden

MId. at 413.
1d at 414.

6

"Id. at 414-15.
67
d. at 414-15 (quoting 3 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER ET AL., RATHKOPF'S LAW OF ZONING
PLANNING § 40.18 (4th ed. 2005)).
6
'Id. at 415.
69
d. (quoting 3 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER ET AL., RATHKOPF'S LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 40.25 (4th ed. 2005)).
70
d.
71
d. at 416.
72Id
113
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factors) and found the Board acted reasonably. 73 The court looked at three
factors to determine whether the board acted reasonably: first, whether
aesthetics could be considered in determining zoning regulation; second,
whether the Board's decision comported with the "county's
Comprehensive Plan 2004;" and finally, whether the Board considered the
wishes of the county's residents. 74
First, the court addressed whether aesthetics could be considered in
determining zoning regulations.7 5 The court pointed out that case law has
routinely permitted aesthetics to be considered in zoning regulations. 76
Additionally, the Kansas statute also expressly permits aesthetics to be
considered.
The Board had presented sufficient findings of fact
involving aesthetics, from their fears over the sheer size of the proposed
wind farms and the height of the proposed windmills and generators, to
maintaining the Tallgrass Prairie and keeping a rural aesthetic look for the
county.7 8
Second, the court examined the Board's consideration of the wind
farms in conjunction with the "county's comprehensive plans." 79 The
court agreed with the district court's assessment that it was reasonable for
the Board to conclude that such wind farms would not fit within the
general goals and welfare determinations contained in the "comprehensive
plan."80
Third, the court examined the Board's consideration of the wishes
of the county's residents. Upon reviewing the Board's findings of facts,
the court noted that the planning commission held several well attended
public meetings concerning the zoning regulations for wind farms, and
that a majority of those who attended voiced their opposition to such wind

73

Id.

74

Id. at 418-19.

7
Id. at 417.
76

1d.
"Id. (noting statute provides that "[t]he governing body may adopt zoning regulations
which may include, but not be limited to, provisions which: . . . (4) control the aesthetics
of redevelopment or new development." (quotingKAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-755(a) (2008))).
78
Id.at 417-19.
"Id. at 418.

"Id. at 419.
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farms. 8 ' The court concluded that the residents' wishes, along with the
aesthetics of the wind farms and their conformity with the "county's
comprehensive plan," were all reasonable factors that the Board could
consider and use to justify its decision to ban commercial wind farms.
The court next addressed whether the district court erred in
precluding Plaintiffs and Intervenors from conducting discovery or
submitting evidence.82 First, the court concluded the district court did not
err when it refused to allow the Board to be deposed.83 The court
concluded that such depositions could arguably violate the separation of
powers.84 As such, since discovery orders are under the discretion of the
district court, it was reasonable for the judge to determine that such
actions might violate the separation of powers doctrine and to refuse to
require the Board to submit to deposition.8 5
The court next addressed whether the zoning regulation violated
the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. 86 First, the court
delineated the standard for determining if a state law violated the Contract
Clause:
(1)[W]hether the state law has, in fact, operated as a
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship; (2)
whether there is a significant and legitimate public purpose
behind the legislation[;] and (3) whether the adjustment of
the contracting parties' rights and responsibilities is based
upon reasonable conditions and is of appropriate character
to the public purpose justifying the legislation's adoption. 87
The court stated that in considering whether a substantial
impairment had occurred, a court should consider whether the industry has
81

d.
Id. at 423.
83Id
82

4Id.
85

Id

8Id. at 425; seeU.S. CONST. art.I, § 10, cl.1.
87
d. at 425-26 (quoting Unified Sch. Dist. No. 443 v. Kan. State Bd. of Educ., 966 P.2d
68, 77 (1998)).
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been regulated in the past.8 8 The court concluded that land development
and the commercial power generation industry are both heavily regulated,
and "when regulation already exists it is foreseeable that changes in the
law may alter contractual obligations." 89 Therefore, the court found that
no substantial impairment occurred. 90 Additionally, the court noted that
these contracts were formed after the Board first put a moratorium on
wind farm permits and the Plaintiffs should have foreseen this
possibility. 9 1 Even though the court found that no substantial impairment
existed, the court noted that if such impairment had existed, the court still
would have ruled in favor of the Board because the Board presented
legitimate and significant purposes for the restriction that were reasonable
and necessary.9 2
The Intervenors additionally argued that the Kansas Electric Public
Act ("KEPUA") prevented the county from passing a zoning regulation
like the one at issue in this case.9 3 The court, however, adopted the view
articulated by the district court. 94 The court noted that in the absence of an
express, clear statement that the state legislature intended to preempt the
regulation of a field, a county may adopt zoning regulations that affect that
field. 95 The court concluded that the legislature only provided two
instances, the placement of nuclear power plants and the placement of
electrical lines over a certain size, which prevented local zoning boards
from affecting electrical regulation and would not imply that they intended
to include any others besides these two specific limitations. 96 Therefore,
the Board could pass a regulation that indirectly affected the electrical
field.97
Next addressed was Intervenors' contention that Congress
preempted zoning regulations through the Public Utility Regulatory
"Id. at 426.
89
Id. at 427.
90
1d.
91
Md.
92

d.

93

Id. at 429; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-101 to -104 (2008).
94
Id. at 429-30.
95
Id. at 429.
96
Id.at 430.
97

d
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Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)." The court, similar to above, held that
there is a strong presumption that Congress did not intend to displace state
law because it did not expressly preempt the field. 99 Not agreeing with
Intervenors' arguments, the court held that federal law regulating wind
energy is so pervasive, it can reasonably be inferred that Congress did not
leave room for the states to supplement it. 00 Intervenors cited five laws to
demonstrate their contention, but the court concluded they failed to
explain how these cases prevented the states from regulating wind energy
and therefore dismissed the claim. 0 '
After addressing and ruling on the merits of the case, the court
briefly addressed whether the Intervenors' action was commenced within
a timely manner and briefly concluded that the district court did have
jurisdiction "to determine whether to allow intervention and [that it was]
within its discretion [when it] chose to permit it."' 02
V. COMMENT
A. A Policy Perspective
A person's initial gut reaction to the decision in Zimmerman might
be that the Kansas Supreme Court somehow got this wrong because the
court upheld a ban on a green energy source. People might feel more
inclined to support this decision if the activity being prohibited were a coal
or a nuclear power plant. However, the situation that arose in Zimmerman
placed a technology usually equated with environmentalism at odds with
direct conservation of a dwindling natural habitat.
As noted earlier in this casenote, Wabaunsee County is located
within the Flint Hills of Kansas, an area that contains the majority of the
once vast Tallgrass Prairie.' 0 3 This natural habitat has slowly been
disappearing.
The former governor of Kansas, Kathleen Sebelius,
"Id.; 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-45 (2006).
99

ld
"Id. at 430-31.

1Id. at 431-32.
oId. at 405.
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commissioned a special task force in 2003 to examine wind development
within this area and, based on the task force's recommendations,
discouraged such development.' 04 Along with Governor Sibelius's
recommendations, several other steps were taken to ensure the protection
of this region, such as local landowners donating some 10,000 acres of the
region to the Kansas Chapter of The Nature Conservancy. 0 5
Although the Wabaunsee County Board of Commissioners' actions
to prohibit commercial wind farms occurred nearly two years before the
generosity of those local landowners, one can clearly see that preservation
was on the mind of the lawmakers. 106 Given this perspective, it should
come as no surprise that the Kansas Supreme Court voted unanimously to
uphold the Board of Commissioners' prohibition of CWECS. From a
purely policy perspective, this decision seems properly decided.
Opponents of the Board's actions and the Kansas Supreme Court's
decision might argue their actions have crippled Kansas's own mandates,
which require 20 percent of their electricity to come from renewable
energy sources by the year 2020.107 However, Kansas ranks third in
measured annual wind energy potential, at 1,070 billions of kWhs.'s This
position makes the most sense. With the state's vast amount of wind
energy potential, there exist numerous other areas, which are not
endangered habitats, where such CWECS can be developed to help meet
Kansas's energy goals.

104 Brent Stahl et al., Wind Energy Laws And Incentives:A Survey ofSelected State Rules,
49 WASHBURN L.J. 99, 110 (2009). The task force delivered its final report in 2004. Id.
105
1d. These donations placed a conservation easement on the land that precludes
development on the land if harmful to the tall grass prairie.Id.
06
' Zimmerman, 218 P.3d at 405-06 (noting that one goal in the Comprehensive Plan 2004
was to "[d]evelop realistic plans to protect natural resources such as the agricultural land,
landscape, scenic views, and Flint Hills through regulatory policies.").
107Stahl et al., supra note 104, atl 12 (citing H.B.
2369, Kan. Reg. Sess. (2009)).
108 David Mears, Note, FeasibilityofResidential Wind
Energy: The Lack ofRegulatory
Integrationfor Local Communities, 37 REAL EST. L.J. 133, 136 (2008) (citing PACIFIC
NORTHWEST LABORATORY, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AVAILABLE
WINDY LAND AREA AND WIND ENERGY POTENTIAL IN THE CONTIGUOUS UNITED STATES

1 (1991), availableat
http://www.awea.org/newsroom/pdf/Top_20_Stateswith-Wind
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B. A Legal Perspective
From a legal standpoint, it is hard to argue with the court's
interpretation of section 12-757(d). As the court noted, prior to the
statute's adoption, a governing body, such as a county board of
commissioners, did not have the authority to "override" the planning
commission's recommendations.1 09
A governing body, like the
Wabaunsee County Board of Commissioners, could only adopt or return
such recommendation."l 0 As the Manly court noted in its interpretation of
the statute, this additional authority (the "override" provision) was plainly
added to give a governing body more freedom in its adoption, in parts or
whole, of recommended zoning amendments, rather than requiring
unnecessary remands and re-votes.111 The Zimmerman court properly
followed precedent when it allowed the Board to adopt the planning
commission's recommendations in part. Following prior precedent
provides clear and consistent guidelines for future county boards.
Additionally, based on well-developed case law, it would have
been an improper departure from precedent had the court failed to
recognize the reasonableness of the Board's actions.
Combined
Investmentll2 and Goldenll 3 clarified that the district court's scope of
review was limited to determininf the lawfulness and reasonableness of
the governing body's actions.l 4 Interestingly, the Plaintiffs and
Intervenors were the ones stressing the importance of the Golden
factors," 5 while defendants sought a more deferential standard and
favorable view from pre-Golden cases.11 6 As noted in the instant decision,
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Zimmerman,218 P.3d at 411.
"od.at 410.
"Id.
at 411 (citing Manly v. City of Shawnee, 194 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2008)).
1l2Combined Inv. Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 605 P.2d 533 (Kan. 1980).
"3Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1978).
ll 4Zimmernan, 218 P.3d at 416.
"'Id. at 414.The Golden factors are, in part: 1) the character of the neighborhood; 2) the
zoning and uses of properties nearby; 3) the suitability of the subject property ... 7) the
recommendations of a permanent or professional planning staff; and 8) the conformance
of the requested change to the city's master or comprehensive plan."Id. (citing Bd. of
Johnson County Comm'rs v. City of Olathe, 952 P.2d 1302, 1309-10 (1998)).
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the court recognized the Kansas appellate court's highly deferential
standard toward the governing body's decisions, and held that from this
standard the governing body only had to present facts that were reasonably
related to its decision. 17 Although the court felt it was unnecessary, it still
applied the Golden factors and held that the Board of Commissioners still
acted reasonably."18
The court correctly concluded that aesthetics were an appropriate
factor to consider in a governing body's decisions. Both case law and
statute support this result."' 9 Gump, Ware v. City of Wichita1 20 , Robert L.
Rieke Bldg. Co. v. City of Overland Park2 1 , Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego 22, all stand for the proposition that a governing body can consider
aesthetics when they make zoning decisions and Kansas law even
specifically provides that a governing body can consider aesthetics, along
with other factors, in making zoning regulations.123 Additionally, the
governing body consulted the county comprehensive plan (something
identified as a Golden factor), which specifically sought to preserve the
scenic nature of the Flint Hills.124 Also, the court properly noted that the
wishes of county residents were correctly considered by the Board in their

decision.' 25
It is important to note that the Kansas Supreme Court never
conclusively stated that the Wabaunsee Board had to deny or accept
Plaintiffs' zoning requests; it merely stated that the Board's decision was
reasonable. This distinction stresses the highly deferential stance courts
will take on zoning matters and other legislative actions. Ideally and
correctly, the court would have taken the same view and analyzed the
l7Id. at 416.
118Id.
"WId. at 416-18.See, e.g., R.H. Gump Revocable Trust v. City of Wichita, 131 P.3d 1268,
1274 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006); KAN.STAT. ANN. § 12-755(4) (2008).
120214 P. 99 (Kan. 1923).
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657 P.2d 1121 (Kan. 1983).
122453

U.S. 490 (1981).

12 3

See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Ware v. City of Wichita, 214
P. 99 (Kan. 1923); Robert L. Rieke Bldg. Co. vs. City of Overland Park, 657 P.2d 1121
(Kan. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-755(4) (2008).
124Id. at 419.
125Id. at 421 (a factor identified in R.H. Gump Revocable Trust v. City of Wichita, 131
P.3d 1268, 1274 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006)).
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Board's decision in the same way if it had approved CWECS. As long as
the Board provides reasonable findings of facts to support its decision,126
the court should uphold this decision, as well. This is a desirable result
because it vests the power to the people of Wabaunsee County. If
residents feel the Board made the wrong zoning decision, they can always
express their disfavor through the democratic process and elect
commissioners who would allow the construction of CWECS.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kansas Supreme Court came to the correct decision in
Zimmerman. Clearly, the factors that the Board considered in its decision
were reasonable. Additionally, the court reaffirmed the tradition of Kansas
courts in taking a highly deferential approach to such decisions. This
approach is important because the people retain the power change such
decisions by electing county board members who would make zoning
decisions the people support. Although Wabaunsee County residents
likely will not take action to ensure CWECS is allowed because of the
delicate habitat in which their county is located, residents from other
counties may take notice that the zoning board's decisions are likely to be
upheld, and if they would like such systems, they will vote for members
who share the same ideals. Additionally, the Court's decision might spur
the Kansas Legislature to take such regulation of wind systems out of the
jurisdiction of individual counties in order to ensure uniformity throughout
the state and promote the overall welfare of the state. Whether this is a
good thing is debatable. However, what is certain is that the Flint Hills
and Tallgrass Prairies are habitats that people are willing to protect and
that Kansas courts are unlikely to overrule zoning decisions.
JOHNATHAN

R. AUSTIN

126Which, in this case, could have been as simple as concluding that CWECS would not

harm the Tallgrass Prairies or affect the aesthetics of the Flint Hills because of some
speculative reason.
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